Freedom of Navigation Monitoring

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Database of Russian Missile and UAV Attacks on Ukrainian Regions from the Occupied Crimea in January 2024

28 February 2024
In January 2024, the Russian Armed Forces (RAF) continued to strike all of Ukraine, using the temporarily occupied territory (TOT) of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC) and the adjacent Black Sea as launchpads for strike and reconnaissance drones, and cruise and ballistic missiles. As predicted, Russia has increased the share of Shahed-136/131 attack drones in its strike arsenal, primarily due to the start of its mass production within the country
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Database of Russian Missile and UAV Attacks on Ukrainian Regions from the Occupied Crimea in January-December 2023

21 January 2024
Over the 12 months of 2023, the Russian Armed Forces used the occupied Crimea to strike at the regions of Ukraine, including with: 230 Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles – from ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (no launches registered since September 25, 2023); at least 1250 Shahed-136/131 UAVs launches, not including those launched from the Russian regions; 62 Iskander ballistic missiles and 25 P-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles. The Monitoring Group of the BlackSeaNews and the Black Sea Institute for Strategic Studies Based on the results of our own monitoring presents the database Russian Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Attacks on the Regions of Ukraine from the Occupied Crimea in January-December 2023.
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Database of Russian Missile and UAV Attacks on Ukrainian Regions from the Occupied Crimea in January-November 2023

26 December 2023
Over the 11 months of 2023, the Russian Armed Forces used the occupied Crimea to strike at the regions of Ukraine, including with: 230 Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles – from ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (no launches registered since September 25, 2023); at least 750 Shahed-136/131 UAVs launches, not including those launched from the Russian regions; 62 Iskander ballistic missiles and 25 P-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles. The Monitoring Group of the BlackSeaNews and the Black Sea Institute for Strategic Studies Based on the results of our own monitoring presents the database Russian Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Attacks on the Regions of Ukraine from the Occupied Crimea in January-November 2023.
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The operations of the Ukrainian temporary maritime export corridor from the ports of Greater Odesa (the database as of 16/10/2023)

17 October 2023
The Monitoring Group of the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies, based on its own monitoring, publishes a database of vessels that arrived in and departed from the ports of Greater Odesa along the new Ukrainian temporary maritime export corridor, which began operating on 16 September 2023. As of 16 October 2023, the number of ships that arrived along this corridor in the ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Pivdenny to take on cargo is 31. Their total deadweight is 1.3 million tons. 17 vessels out of 31 have already left the ports with cargo and are on their way to or have already arrived in their ports of destination.
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The fate of the ships that were in the ports of Ukraine on 24 February 2022: The updated database

27 September 2023
As of 26 September 2023, of the 100 vessels that were blocked in Ukrainian ports on 24 February 2022, 50 remain: 29 of them are in the ports of the Mykolaiv region, 14 – in Kherson, and 5 – in Mariupol. For various reasons, 2 sea vessels out of 41 that were blocked on 24 February 2022 remain in the ports of the Odesa region. Of these 50 vessels, 15 belong to shipowner companies from EU countries (8 – to Greek shipowners, 3 – to Maltese ones, 1 vessel – to shipowners from Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, and Denmark each), 14 – to shipowners from Turkey, and 8 – to Ukrainian shipowner companies. Other shipowners include companies from Norway, China, Great Britain, Montenegro, Bangladesh, the Marshall Islands, Lebanon, Egypt, and Singapore.
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The grain corridor in the Black Sea in June – July 2023: The final statistics and database

02 August 2023
Long periods, starting from 9 May 2023, when no ships arrived at the ports, were explained not by weather conditions, but solely by the blocking of inspections by Russian JCC inspectors under various pretexts.
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Foreign Merchant Ships Calling at Russian Ports Before Proceeding to the Ukrainian Ones

01 July 2023
Initially, a direct voyage from a Russian port to a Ukrainian one during the war struck us as a coincidence that, however, prompted us to start checking for similar voyages by other vessels. As a result, we've easily identified a fairly significant number of vessels that arrived at Ukrainian ports having previously called at the Russian ports. For security reasons, including counteracting possible sabotage, special decisions should be made to prevent maritime businesses from chartering vessels that operate to Russian ports for the transportation of goods to/from Ukrainian ports or simply ban such vessels from entering Ukrainian ports.
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The grain corridor in the Black Sea in April-May 2023: Russia’s ultimatum demanding the lifting of sanctions

31 May 2023
No ships arrived at Ukrainian ports through the grain corridor from 9 to 20 May 2023. There have been no interruptions for such a long time since the beginning of the Black Sea Grain Initiative. This happened soon after 13 April 2023, when Russia for the first time formally compiled a detailed list of demands for the lifting of sanctions in return for its further participation in the Grain Initiative. The demands were presented in the form of an ultimatum to the UN Secretariat, although the UN cannot resolve the issue of easing sanctions.
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The Black Sea «Grain Corridor» between September 2022 - March 2023 — New Highlights

17 March 2023
The average daily number of ships arriving at the ports of Odesa as part of the «Black Sea Grain Initiative» is one of the indicators of military risks for the region. While in September 2022, it averaged 5.9 vessels per day, in October – 5.1, in November 2022 – 3.3, in December – 3.2, in January 2023 – 2.8, in February – 2.5 and between March 1-10, 2023 – 2.8 vessels per day. The decrease is the result of Russia conscious policy of inspecting no more than 3-4 vessels per day as part of its joint inspections with Turkey. The RF agreement to extend the «grain initiative» for 60, instead of the previous 120 days, is predetermined by the single factor — the May 14, 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey.
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The "grain corridor" in the Black Sea in September-December 2022. Important statistics

22 January 2023
The average number of vessels arriving per day at the ports of Odesa as part of the Black Sea Grain Initiative is one of the indicators of military risks. In September 2022, it was 5.9 vessels per day; in October – 5.1; in November – 3.3; and in December – 3.2. That is, in November, as a result of Russia’s deliberate actions, the number of vessels receiving permits for voyages to Ukrainian ports almost halved. Blocking the "grain corridor" remains an integral part of Putin's plan for a new stage of the war. That is, in the event of a new Russian offensive, the "grain corridor" may be blocked.
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The presence of Russian warships in the Mediterranean Sea as of 6 November 2022

06 November 2022
As we have predicted earlier, Russia continues the reduction and rotation of its naval group in the Mediterranean. On 16 October 2022, 2 missile corvettes of the Russian Baltic Fleet - (531) Soobrazitelnyi and (545) Stoikiy - entered the Mediterranean Sea through the Strait of Gibraltar. On 21 October 2022, the missile cruiser (011) Varyag, the flagship of the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Federation (PF), the large anti-submarine ship (564) Admiral Tributs (PF), and the oil tanker/supply ship Boris Butoma left the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal.
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The “grain corridor”: Russia has artificially increased the waiting time for the inspection of ships carrying Ukrainian grain in the Sea of Marmara

01 November 2022
Since 18 September 2022, the waiting time for the “grain fleet” vessels to be inspected by the Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) in the Sea of Marmara has increased by 5 times and reached 11.3 days per vessel. Such a situation is totally disadvantageous for 3 out of 4 participants of the "grain initiative" - the UN, Turkey, and Ukraine. Our main assumption is that Russia is once again using this situation in connection with other issues - for example, the ceasefire on the front line, which is located at a distance of 40-60 km from the grain corridor area.
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The Presence of Russian Warships in the Mediterranean Sea as of 10 October 2022

12 October 2022
As of October 10, 2022, the confirmed composition of the Russian Navy ship group in the Mediterranean Sea includes 8 warships — 6 of which missile — and 3 auxiliary vessels. On September 19, 2022, the Baltic Fleet reconnaissance ship Vasiliy Tatishchev left the Mediterranean Sea via Gibraltar and on September 24, 2022, — the Black Sea Fleet missile submarine Novorossiysk accompanied by the Sergey Balk tug. We maintain that the Russian Navy will continue this Mediterranean Sea rotation in the near future.
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As of September 26, 2022, 60 of 100 vessels remain blocked in the ports of Ukraine/ Database

28 September 2022
As of February 24, 2022, 100 commercial vessels docked in the Ukrainian ports, not counting those of the occupied Crimea, all of which remained under the naval blockade by the Russian Federation. Of these 100, 34 belong to ship-owning companies from the EU countries, namely, 21— Greece and 24 — Turkey. As of September 26, 60 of the 100 vessels remain blocked: 29 – in the Mykolaiv region ports, 14 – in Kherson and 5 – in Mariupol. For various reasons, 12 of the 41 that were blocked on February 24, currently remain in the ports of the Odesa region.
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The Presence of Russian Warships in the Mediterranean Sea as of 15 September 2022

16 September 2022
In late summer of 2022, Russia began the rotation of part of its warships in the Mediterranean Sea. missile ships of the Northern Fleet, a reconnaissance ship of the Black Sea Fleet, 2 oil tankers of the Black Sea and Northern Fleets were withdrawn from the Mediterranean Sea. As of 15 September 2022, the confirmed composition of the Russian Navy squadron in the Mediterranean Sea includes 10 ships (7 of which are missile ships) and 4 auxiliary vessels. If another missile submarine is officially confirmed to be in the Mediterranean, the total number of ships will change from 10 to 11, and the number of missile ships will rise from 7 to 8.