Militarization of the Black Sea
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Database of Russian Attacks on Black Sea Ports in January-September 2025
30 October 2025
Between January-September 2025, Russian military attacked the ports of Greater Odesa involved in the export corridor operation, Danube and Odesa Oblast 107 times, using no less than: 40 Iskander CM and BM; 5 Kh-59/Kh-69 ALCMs; 11 Kh-31P ARMs; 1 Kalibr SLCMs; 4 Oniks AShs; 3 USVs; 750 strike and decoy UAVs.
Database of Russian Attacks on Black Sea Ports in January-August 2025
19 September 2025
Between January-August 2025 Russian military attacked the ports of Greater Odesa involved in the export corridor operation, ports of Danube River and Odesa Oblast 96 times, using no less than: 35 CM and BM Iskander missiles; 5 Kh-59/Kh-69 ALCMs; 11 Kh-31P ARMs; 1 Kalibr SLCMs; 4 Oniks AShM; 3 USVs; 650 strike and decoy UAVs.
Database of Russian Attacks on Black Sea Ports in January-July 2025
29 August 2025
In January-July 2025 Russian military attacked the ports of Greater Odesa involved in the export corridor operation, and Odesa Oblast 86 times, using no less than: 29 CM and BM Iskander missiles; 5 Kh-59/Kh-69 ALCMs; 11 Kh-31P ARMs; 1 Kalibr SLCMs; 4 Oniks AShM; 550 strike and decoy UAVs.
The New Realities of the War at Sea
25 August 2025
The Russian-Ukrainian war has fundamentally transformed naval combat operations. Ukrainian unmanned surface vessels (USVs) have been deployed extensively—first as kamikaze drones, then expanding to roles including reconnaissance, mine laying, and carrying remotely operated 12.7mm anti-aircraft machine guns, surface-to-air missiles, rocket projectiles, FPV drones, and combat lasers. Ukraine’s innovative approach allowed it to seize the maritime initiative as early as 2022, shifting the balance in its favor.
Advancements in Russian Naval Drones and Their Role in the Armed Forces
09 August 2025
After the success of Ukrainian maritime unmanned vehicles (in official Ukrainian terminology: MBUA — Maritime Uncrewed Vehicles) in the Black Sea — which drove the Russian fleet into the port of Novorossiysk and even forced some vessels to withdraw to the Caspian Sea — Russia has, quite naturally, initiated efforts to replicate Ukraine’s approach. Russian Federation is now vigorously integrating unmanned maritime assets into its naval forces.
Database of Russian Attacks on Black Sea Ports in January-June 2025
08 August 2025
In January-June 2025 Russian military attacked the ports of Greater Odesa involved in the export corridor operation, and Odesa Oblast 70 times, using no less than: 25 CM and BM Iskander missiles; 5 Kh-59/Kh-69 ASMs; 10 Kh-31P ARMs; 1 Kalibr SLCMs; 4 Onyx AShM; 450 strike and decoy UAVs.
How Ukraine Destroyed the Russian Black Sea Fleet Without Having One of Its Own
15 May 2025
The defeat of the "famous and heroic" Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) is not only a military-strategic, but also a geopolitical fact and a defining factor in the Ukraine-Russia war, one with regional and even global political significance that is reshaping the practice of naval warfare in modern conflicts. Our research has repeatedly documented the full history of sinkings and damages to Russian BSF ships and boats: 22 destroyed, excluding those irreparable, and 20 damaged, including irreparable ones.
Ukrainian Black Sea Corridor as Russia's Key Military Target. Part 5
21 January 2025
The incomparably more successful operation of the Ukrainian maritime corridor to the three ports of Greater Odesa – Chornomorsk, Odesa, and Pivdennyi – than that of the Black Sea Grain Initiative under the auspices of the UN, Turkey, and the Russian Federation pushes Russia to raise the question of resuming the terminated grain deal (with Russia's participation in cargo control) during any negotiations with Turkish officials. Notably, that position is echoed by the UN Secretariat officials.
Russia is developing a new strategy to increase security risks in the Black Sea in response to the defeat of the Black Sea Fleet. Part 4
17 January 2025
The situation in the Black Sea in the coming year will remain volatile with a tendency towards increased military risks. This will amplify the risks to the EU countries in the Black Sea – Romania and Bulgaria – as well as to Moldova and Turkey. Over the years of the Crimean Peninsula occupation, Russia has established a powerful land force there, including modern missile and aviation branches of its armed forces, with a developed logistics infrastructure for supplying troops, including through transport links with the Russian mainland – both via sea vessels and the so-called Crimean Bridge.
Russia's Ways of Raising the World Oil Prices. Part 3
15 January 2025
Russia has already begun taking measures to raise global oil prices, as the downward trend is utterly unacceptable for the aggressor state waging the war. While in August 2024 we did not record any tankers heading east from Russian Baltic ports around Africa, bypassing the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, in September there were already 7 such cases, and in October – 13 ones.
Ways to Reduce Russia's Revenues from Seaborne Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Exports. Part 2
31 December 2024
The authors of this report represent the team that has been monitoring maritime traffic for the last 15 years. Since April 2022, we have been monitoring the traffic of tankers carrying Russian crude oil and petroleum products on a daily basis. Based on our experience, we argue that it's futile to counter "Russia's shadow fleet," as it's futile to counter anything that doesn't exist. What does exist instead is a fleet of tankers that transport Russian crude oil and petroleum products around the world.
European Security Risks and Forecasts as of Early 2025. Part 1
18 December 2024
The main risk factor that determines the duration of Russia's war against Ukraine is the volume of maritime exports of Russian crude oil and petroleum products. It must be restricted in the Baltic and/or North Seas. The situation in the Black Sea in the coming year will remain volatile with a tendency towards increased military risks. This will amplify the risks to the EU countries in the Black Sea – Romania and Bulgaria – as well as to Moldova and Turkey. Russia will continue to attack Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea and the Danube, trying to stop the operation of the maritime corridor and at the same time create conditions for increasing its own seaborne grain exports.
Database of Ukrainian Attacks on the Occupied Crimea, Russian Ships and Facilities on the Black Sea Coast in January-October 2024
26 November 2024
Between January and October 2024, i.e. over 304 days, the Ukrainian Defense Forces launched no less than 125 attacks on targets in the occupied Crimean Peninsula and ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Those included no less than: 33 attacks in Sevastopol, 16 on Russian Navy ships in the Black and Azov Seas, 24 in Western Crimea, 12 in the Dzhankoi region, 7 on Feodosia region, and 29 on the Black Sea coast of the Russian Federation.
Ukrainian grain corridor: why Russia started the hunting season for grain carriers in Odesa ports
17 October 2024
Russia has begun systematically shelling grain carriers that use the Ukrainian grain corridor. The attacks have become the continuation of the ongoing shelling of port infrastructure in Odesa region and have already caused damage to several vessels, as well as injuries and deaths. The collective response of the Black Sea countries is needed to deter the aggressor.
Review and Database of Ukrainian Attacks on the Occupied Crimea, Russian Ships and Facilities on the Black Sea Coast in January-September 2024
16 October 2024
Between January and September 2024, i.e. over 273 days, the Ukrainian Defense Forces launched no less than 111 attacks on targets in the occupied Crimean Peninsula and ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Those included no less than: 30 attacks on Sevastopol, 16 on Russian Navy ships in the Black and Azov Seas, 21 on Western Crimea, 11 on Dzhankoi district, 6 on Feodosia region, and 26 on the Black Sea coast of the Russian Federation.