Articles

The Problem of Assessing Russia's Economic Capacity to Wage War Under Sanctions. Part 6
21 January 2025
Extremely important political conclusions are made on the basis of the Russian official statistics and with the use of classical methods of peacetime economic and social analysis under the conditions of deliberate disinformation campaigns waged by Russia, which are intended to lead to such conclusions. Note that the BSISS conclusions had been drawn, but not yet published, a few days prior to the recent crash of the Russian Sukhoi Superjet at Antalya Airport, Turkey.

Ukrainian Black Sea Corridor as Russia's Key Military Target. Part 5
21 January 2025
The incomparably more successful operation of the Ukrainian maritime corridor to the three ports of Greater Odesa – Chornomorsk, Odesa, and Pivdennyi – than that of the Black Sea Grain Initiative under the auspices of the UN, Turkey, and the Russian Federation pushes Russia to raise the question of resuming the terminated grain deal (with Russia's participation in cargo control) during any negotiations with Turkish officials. Notably, that position is echoed by the UN Secretariat officials.

Russia is developing a new strategy to increase security risks in the Black Sea in response to the defeat of the Black Sea Fleet. Part 4
17 January 2025
The situation in the Black Sea in the coming year will remain volatile with a tendency towards increased military risks. This will amplify the risks to the EU countries in the Black Sea – Romania and Bulgaria – as well as to Moldova and Turkey. Over the years of the Crimean Peninsula occupation, Russia has established a powerful land force there, including modern missile and aviation branches of its armed forces, with a developed logistics infrastructure for supplying troops, including through transport links with the Russian mainland – both via sea vessels and the so-called Crimean Bridge.

Russia's Ways of Raising the World Oil Prices. Part 3
15 January 2025
Russia has already begun taking measures to raise global oil prices, as the downward trend is utterly unacceptable for the aggressor state waging the war. While in August 2024 we did not record any tankers heading east from Russian Baltic ports around Africa, bypassing the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, in September there were already 7 such cases, and in October – 13 ones.

Ways to Reduce Russia's Revenues from Seaborne Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Exports. Part 2
31 December 2024
The authors of this report represent the team that has been monitoring maritime traffic for the last 15 years. Since April 2022, we have been monitoring the traffic of tankers carrying Russian crude oil and petroleum products on a daily basis. Based on our experience, we argue that it's futile to counter "Russia's shadow fleet," as it's futile to counter anything that doesn't exist. What does exist instead is a fleet of tankers that transport Russian crude oil and petroleum products around the world.

European Security Risks and Forecasts as of Early 2025. Part 1
18 December 2024
The main risk factor that determines the duration of Russia's war against Ukraine is the volume of maritime exports of Russian crude oil and petroleum products. It must be restricted in the Baltic and/or North Seas. The situation in the Black Sea in the coming year will remain volatile with a tendency towards increased military risks. This will amplify the risks to the EU countries in the Black Sea – Romania and Bulgaria – as well as to Moldova and Turkey. Russia will continue to attack Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea and the Danube, trying to stop the operation of the maritime corridor and at the same time create conditions for increasing its own seaborne grain exports.

Sanctions Must Continue: A Comparative Analysis of Sanctions Against Legal Entities
15 December 2024
If the goal is to, at the very least, prevent military production by the Russian Federation, the process of identifying relevant legal entities and applying sanctions must continue at full speed. Exposing and restricting every enterprise directly or indirectly related to the Russian military-industrial complex or war financing is crucial in preventing the aggressor from producing modern weapons of the qualities and in the quantities required for warfare.

Database of Ukrainian Attacks on the Occupied Crimea, Russian Ships and Facilities on the Black Sea Coast in January-October 2024
26 November 2024
Between January and October 2024, i.e. over 304 days, the Ukrainian Defense Forces launched no less than 125 attacks on targets in the occupied Crimean Peninsula and ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Those included no less than: 33 attacks in Sevastopol, 16 on Russian Navy ships in the Black and Azov Seas, 24 in Western Crimea, 12 in the Dzhankoi region, 7 on Feodosia region, and 29 on the Black Sea coast of the Russian Federation.

Ukrainian grain corridor: why Russia started the hunting season for grain carriers in Odesa ports
17 October 2024
Russia has begun systematically shelling grain carriers that use the Ukrainian grain corridor. The attacks have become the continuation of the ongoing shelling of port infrastructure in Odesa region and have already caused damage to several vessels, as well as injuries and deaths. The collective response of the Black Sea countries is needed to deter the aggressor.

Review and Database of Ukrainian Attacks on the Occupied Crimea, Russian Ships and Facilities on the Black Sea Coast in January-September 2024
16 October 2024
Between January and September 2024, i.e. over 273 days, the Ukrainian Defense Forces launched no less than 111 attacks on targets in the occupied Crimean Peninsula and ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Those included no less than: 30 attacks on Sevastopol, 16 on Russian Navy ships in the Black and Azov Seas, 21 on Western Crimea, 11 on Dzhankoi district, 6 on Feodosia region, and 26 on the Black Sea coast of the Russian Federation.

The first element of Russia's new maritime tactics/strategy in the Black Sea
15 October 2024
Our ongoing daily monitoring and analysis of the Ukrainian sea corridor operation leads us to believe that the ballistic missile attacks on the ports of Greater Odesa that damage the ships are NOT episodes, but rather a new strategy aimed at incapacitating the Ukrainian sea corridor.

Russian Baltic Sea Ports Petroleum Products Imports to the EU Embargo: Database of September 2024 Violations
15 October 2024
In September 2024, 12 violations (517.858 tons) of the EU embargo on seaborne imports of Russian petroleum products (excluding crude oil) to the transshipment points and EU/US ports from the Baltic Sea were recorded. The voyages were made by tankers belonging to shipowners registered in the following countries: Greece, Italy, Turkey, UAE, Seychelles, Marshall Islands.

Database of Russian Missile and UAV Attacks on Ukrainian Regions from the Occupied Crimea in January-September 2024
15 October 2024
In January-September 2024, for attacks on regions of Ukraine from the occupied Crimea, Russian Armed Forces used no less than: 68 Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles, 153 Iskander-type ballistic missiles, 1 P-800 Oniks anti-ship missile, 4 3М22 Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles, 1791 Shahed-136/131 UAVs launched simultaneously from Crimea and regions of Russia, 360 Shahed-136/131 UAVs launched from Crimea only and 169 reconnaissance UAVs of various types.

Russian Crude Oil Imports to the EU Embargo Through the Russian Baltic Sea Ports: Database of September 2024 Violations
15 October 2024
In September 2024, 5 violations of the EU embargo on seaborne imports of Russian crude oil from the Baltic Sea were recorded. Two voyages were performed directly to the ports of the EU countries. Three voyages were involved the delivery of crude oil to the transshipment points in the Laconian Gulf off the coast of Greece and Italy.

99 Tankers Exported Crude Oil from Russian Baltic Sea Ports in September 2024: Database
14 October 2024
The Monitoring Group of the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies and BlackSeaNews presents a database of seaborne exports of crude oil from Russian ports on the Baltic Sea in September 2024. In total, 99 tankers exported crude oil from Russian ports on the Baltic Sea. They transported a total of about 11.6 million tons of crude oil.