Articles

The efforts of the civilized world to counter Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet,” which transports Russian crude oil and petroleum products, are not delivering effective results. Reports in global media about an alleged decline in exports of “blood oil” are, in fact, a dangerous illusion based on distorted data. This is evidenced by an analysis of Russia’s maritime oil exports conducted by the Black Sea Institute for Strategic Studies. This analysis provides a solid foundation for developing genuinely effective policy responses to curb Russia’s energy exports.

For centuries, the Black Sea has been a strategic crossroads of global trade and power. Linking the Eurasian continent to the Mediterranean and beyond, it has served as a commercial artery and a geopolitical fault line. The presence of a strong Russian fleet will perpetually threaten shipping, ports, and infrastructure. It will always provide Moscow with a lever for the coercion of Ukraine and Europe.

From February 2022 through April 2026, the Defense Forces of Ukraine carried out at least 62 successful attacks on Russian warships in the Black and Azov Seas, in ports and at sea, using missiles, small unmanned surface vessels, and UAVs.

In January–February 2026, Russian forces carried out no fewer than 45 attacks using missiles, UAVs, and USVs on the ports of Greater Odesa involved in the Ukrainian export corridor, Danube region ports, and Odesa Oblast. The strikes involved no fewer than: 6 Iskander BMs, 9 Kh-31P ARMs, 12 Kh-101 cruise missiles, 4 guided aerial bombs, and no fewer than 420 strike and decoy UAVs.

According to the Monitoring Group of the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies, since the start of the full‑scale war ETHERA has completed 10 voyages, moving about 460,000 tons of Russian oil products to ports in Turkey, Morocco, and Brazil, as well as to STS transfer areas near EU coasts (Greece and Cyprus). It loaded at Russian ports in the Black Sea (Novorossiysk, Taman, and an offshore STS zone south of the Kerch Strait) and in the Baltic (Primorsk, Ust‑Luga, Saint Petersburg).

In January 2026, 11 violations (486 483 tons) of the EU/US embargo on seaborne imports of Russian petroleum products (excluding crude oil) to the transshipment points and EU/US ports from the Baltic Sea were recorded. The voyages were made by tankers belonging to shipowners registered in Greece, UAE, Singapore and China.

In January 2026, 3 violations (280 540 tons) of the EU embargo on seaborne imports of Russian crude oil from the Baltic Sea were recorded. The voyages were made by tankers belonging to shipowners registered in Greece and Liberia.

In January 2026, a total of 20 tankers exported CPC oil from the Russian port of Novorossiysk. Together they exported a total of about 3 million tons of oil, including 2.4 million tons to the EU and 548 thousands tons to other countries.

In January 2026, 198 violations of the export of Russian crude oil and petroleum products from the Baltic Sea were recorded. 17.1 mln tons of Russian crude oil and petroleum products were delivered through the Russian ports of the Baltic Sea.

In January 2026, 8 violations of the EU embargo on seaborne imports of Russian crude oil from the Black Sea were recorded. Six of them were involved the delivery of crude oil to the ports of the EU countries. Two voyages were made to the transshipment points near the EU ports. In January 2026, a total of 912.684 tons of Russian crude oil were delivered to the EU in violation of the embargo.

Despite Western sanctions, Russia managed to maintain operational civil aviation throughout 2025 by relying on parallel import networks in countries that did not impose sanctions restrictions. While the UAE, Turkey, and China served as primary transit hubs during 2022–2024, new enforcement measures in late 2024 prompted corresponding modifications to Russia's evasion schemes. Specifically, by 2025, India had emerged as the principal channel with documented shipments exceeding $50 million, routes through Central Asia and the Caucasus proliferated via multi-jurisdictional corporate chains, and intermediaries increasingly shifted business models and jurisdictions to evade detection. This report documents the specific trends and developments of 2025 against the baseline sanctions-evasion architecture established during 2022–2024.

In January 2026, 9 violations of the EU embargo on seaborne imports of Russian petroleum products (excluding crude oil) from the Black Sea were recorded. 8 of violations involved the delivery of petroleum products to a transshipment points off the coasts of Cyprus and Romania. 1 direct voyage was made to the port of EU. In January 2026, 327.716 tons of Russian petroleum products were delivered in violation of the embargo.

In January 2026, 166 violations of the export of Russian crude oil and petroleum products from the Black Sea were recorded. Almost 10.3 mln tons of Russian crude oil, Kazakh crude oil by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) and petroleum products were delivered through the Russian ports of the Black Sea.

In January 2026, Russian forces carried out no fewer than 22 attacks using missiles, UAVs, and USVs on the ports of Greater Odesa involved in the Ukrainian export corridor, Danube region ports, and Odesa Oblast. The strikes involved no less than: 5 Iskander BMs, 2 Kh-31P ARMs, 4 guided aerial bombs (GBU), and no fewer than 200 strike and decoy UAVs.

In December 2025, a total of 25 tankers exported CPC oil from the Russian port of Novorossiysk. Together they exported a total of about 3.8 million tons of oil, including 3.1 million tons to the EU and 739 thousands tons to other countries.