The Kremlin's Aggressive Policy in the Northern Sea Route: Is There an Antidote?
Bohdan USTYMENKO,
Head of the National Security Institute, PhD in PLSC
Formation of maritime policy is of particular importance to Vladimir Putin. In 2001, the year after his election as President, the Russian President approved the first RF Maritime Doctrine. In 2015, after the occupation of Crimea and the simultaneous seizure of about ¾ of the entire area of Ukrainian maritime spaces in the Azov-Black Sea basin in 2014, the second Maritime Doctrine was approved. The third, current Maritime Doctrine, was approved in the year the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine began.
In order to strengthen his influence on the maritime sector of the state, the Russian President created the Maritime Collegium on August 13, 2024. Collegium is responsible, in particular, for strengthening Russia's defense and security in the World Ocean and developing the Northern Sea Route. The Maritime Collegium is headed by one of V. Putin's closest friends, Nikolai Patrushev, former FSB Director and Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. Such an important appointment may indicate that Vladimir Putin is very seriously preparing to wage a hybrid war against NATO in the maritime domain, which may also include acts of underwater sabotage not only in the Baltic Sea, but also in the North and Mediterranean Seas and other areas of the World Ocean, where critical underwater infrastructure facilities of NATO member states are located.
The current Maritime Doctrine of the RF reflects Vladimir Putin’s views, in particular, on the main international processes and demonstrates his undisguised desire to dominate the Arctic region, primarily through the actual “privatization” of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Russia considers the NSR to be its “national transport communication” and has a clear intention to “control naval activities of foreign states” in the water area. In addition, a navigation permit procedure has been introduced in the NSR. No vessel may enter the NSR without the permission of the State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom (Rosatom) or an organization authorized by Rosatom.
It is important to note that the NSR is not a thin line on a map or a narrow sea corridor. It is a vast sea space consisting of 28 areas, the boundaries of which extend far beyond the territorial sea of the RF.
At the same time, Russian strategic planning documents state that Russia will defend its interests, in particular, by fostering the combat potential of the forces (troops) of the Northern and Pacific Fleets, of the federal security service, as well as the forces and means of the Russian Guard.
The permit-based navigation regime in the NSR illegally restricts freedom of navigation, directly violates international law, in particular the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and will most likely lead to an armed conflict between Russia and NATO in the future.
A number of Russian experts and scientists believe that despite the fact that the Russian Federation ratified UNCLOS in 1997, the Convention does not apply to the Russian “Arctic sector”, and Russia has “special, preferential rights” in the Arctic region and, accordingly, in the Arctic Ocean. For example, Professors I. Zenkin and S. Guriev “International Maritime Law” write in the popular Russian textbook that the shelf of the “Russian Arctic sector” belongs exclusively to Russia. At the same time, the upper point of this “sector” is the North Pole, while the lateral points are the extreme western and extreme eastern points of the Russian border along the Arctic Ocean. It is important to add that the “sector” that Russia is so eager to obtain covers about half of the entire area of the Arctic Ocean!
Leading Russian scientists also believe that Russia, within its jurisdiction, can organize flights of civil aircraft over the NSR (which in fact means to establish the permit regime for flights in the airspace over the NSR), as well as has exclusive rights to explore and develop minerals within the "Russian Arctic sector".
Thus, there is a risk that Russia could illegally seize about 6.8 million square kilometers of the Arctic Ocean floor, the so-called “Russian sector”, as well as the airspace over the NSR, using its own laws as a legalization tool. Moreover, the negative precedent has already been set — in front of the whole world, Russia has illegally appropriated a huge area of the NSR.
A particular threat to global security may be Russian-Chinese cooperation in the use of the Arctic Ocean. It is well known that the states seek to boost the implementation of joint projects in the development of coastal/port infrastructure of the NSR and mining in the Arctic region. There is a direct interdependence between the two states: colossal resources of the Arctic are critically important for China, in particular gas, as well as navigation in the NSR; Russia, in turn, vitally needs Chinese investments and technologies. At the same time, if China, using Russia as a springboard, achieves dominance in the Arctic, this could lead to global supremacy for China, given the huge resource and logistics potential of the mentioned region.
In addition, Russia and China may in the future use the NSR and its ports for naval operations and/or acts of (underwater) sabotage. Climate change may also threaten the emergence of new Russian and/or Chinese military assets on the islands of the Arctic basin, in particular the Franz Josef Land archipelago, and the future deployment of Chinese strategic and multi-purpose nuclear submarines as an element of the water area control.
Also, in the event of a negative scenario in the Arctic, China, together with Russia or independently, could try to occupy Nunavut, a weakly defended territory of Canada. It is generally known that the natural resources of Arctic Nunavut have attracted China many years.
In addition to the obvious recommendation on the need for a radical strengthening of NATO's combat capabilities, particularly in the Arctic region, it seems appropriate to recommend the following:
1. As history has shown, in particular the collapse of the Soviet Union, the deep economic crisis of the 1990s in the independent Russian Federation, as well as further economic growth associated with the increase in world prices for Russian oil, oil products and natural gas since the late 1990s, Russia continues to commit large-scale acts of aggression when it disposes of sufficient funds (the attack on Georgia in 2008, the occupation of Crimea and about 100,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian maritime space in 2014, Russia's intervention in Syria in 2015, a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022).
Therefore, it is necessary to limit import of Russian oil, oil products and natural gas as much as possible through sanctions pressure. The implementation of this sanctions policy will also stop the development of dangerous joint Russian-Chinese projects in the Arctic, lead to the degradation of the armed forces of the aggressor state, and, accordingly, ensure international peace and security in the Arctic region.
2. In accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly may request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on any legal question.
One should study the issue of a request to be made by the General Assembly to the International Court of Justice. Such a request will be aimed at obtaining an advisory opinion, which would, in particular, contain an answer to the question of the legal regime of the Arctic Ocean and the regime of navigation in it. Even though the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice has no binding force, such a document will be of paramount importance in making political decisions and in eventual preparation and discussion of a draft international treaty on the legal regime of the Arctic Ocean.
3. To maintain international peace and security in the Arctic region, it seems worthwhile discussing the issue of concluding a Convention on the Legal Regime of the Arctic Ocean by all Arctic states and other subjects of international law, the legal foundation for such regime being the UN Charter and UNCLOS.
4. In order to prevent the dominance of undemocratic states in the Arctic region, enhance security of Nunavut and neighboring Greenland, as well as protect against potential acts of aggression, it seems appropriate to consider concluding with the United States of special security agreements that would comply with the requirements of international law.
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*The Northern Sea Route (NSR) is a shipping route approximately 5,600 kilometers long. It is the shortest shipping route between the western part of Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific region, including between the European part of Russia and the Far East.
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