Ukrainian Black Sea Corridor as Russia's Key Military Target. Part 5

The Monitoring Group of BlackSeaNews
and the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies

presents Part 5 of the Report on European security risks and forecasts as of late 2024 – early 2025, based on the monitoring results of the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies, Ukraine.

European Security Risks and Forecasts as of Early 2025. Part 1
Ways to Reduce Russia's Revenues from Seaborne Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Exports. Part 2
Russia's Ways of Raising the World Oil Prices. Part 3

Russia is developing a new strategy to increase security risks in the Black Sea in response to the defeat of the Black Sea Fleet. Part 4

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The incomparably more successful operation of the Ukrainian maritime corridor to the three ports of Greater Odesa – Chornomorsk, Odesa, and Pivdennyi – than that of the Black Sea Grain Initiative under the auspices of the UN, Turkey, and the Russian Federation pushes Russia to raise the question of resuming the terminated grain deal (with Russia's participation in cargo control) during any negotiations with Turkish officials. Notably, that position is echoed by the UN Secretariat officials.

As a reminder, the UN Black Sea Grain Initiative was in effect from 01 August 2022 to 17 July 2023, when the agreement was terminated because of Russia's withdrawal from it.
In the first months of the UN Grain Corridor operation, an average of 5-6 vessels arrived at Odesa ports daily, but then, due to trumped-up hindrances to inspections, that figure quickly dropped to 3, 2.5, 1.2, and finally 0 vessels (see Table 1).

Overall, in the year of the UN Grain Corridor operation, the number of ships entering the ports of Greater Odesa averaged 3 per day, or 1 – to each of the ports.

Table 1. The UN Maritime Corridor Data for 2022-2023

Month Monthly number of ships arriving at the ports of Greater Odesa Daily number of ships arriving at the ports of Greater Odesa

August 2022

105

3,4

September 2022

176

5,9

October 2022

158

5,1

November 2022

98

3,3

December 2022

100

3,2

January 2023

88

2,8

February 2023

70

2,5

March 2023

87

2,8

April 2023

57

1,9

May 2023

38

1,2

June 2023

27

0,9

July 2023

0

0

Total

1004

2,75

As is clearly seen from the table below, the efficiency of the Ukrainian maritime corridor is three times higher than that of the UN one.

Table 2. The Ukrainian Maritime Corridor Data for 2024

Month Monthly number of ships arriving at the ports of Greater Odesa Daily number of ships arriving at the ports of Greater Odesa

January

226

7,3

February

280

9,7

March

268

8,6

April

287

9,6

May

242

7,8

June

258

8,6

July

236

7,6

August

235

7,6

September

229

7,6

October

268

8,6

Total

2529

8,3

 

The Ukrainian Defence Forces play a crucial role in the corridor's operation, having made the Western part of the Black Sea off-limits to Russian ships. Besides the Black Sea Fleet’s losses, the liberation of Zmiinyi Island and the destruction of locators, helipads, and mini garrisons on offshore gas platforms on the sea shelf have also greatly contributed to the waters’ safety.

Another important factor is Ukrainian attacks on the western coast of occupied Crimea, where Sevastopol, Russian missile positions, radar stations, and military airfields are all located.

Between January and September 2024, i.e., over 273 days, the Ukrainian Defence Forces carried out at least 111 attacks on targets in Crimea, Russia’s ships and the Russian Black Sea coast, averaging one every 3 days. Among those were at least 30 attacks (28%) on Sevastopol, 16 (15%) on warships at sea, 21 (20%) on Western Crimea, and 26 (23.5%) on Russia's Black Sea coast.

Russia certainly understands that Ukrainian maritime exports earn money that supports the country's resistance to the aggression. Therefore, Russian air attacks remain the main risk to the Odesa region and the entire western part of the Black Sea region.

Over January-October 2024, we recorded at least 113 Russian attacks on the port, energy, and other infrastructure of the Odesa region where the maritime corridor is located.

At the end of 2024, for the first time, 7 foreign vessels were also damaged in the attacks (see the list below).

Table 3. The Number of Russian Attacks on Ukrainian Ports and Ships Damaged

2024

Number of missile and UAV attacks Number of docked ships damaged in the attacks

January

3

-

February

6

-

March

18

-

April

14

-

May

12

-

June

10

-

July

16

1

August

9

-

September

15

2

October

14

4

Total

116

7

 

The list of cargo ships damaged in the Russian attacks:

1. 10.07.2024. ARTEY. IMO: 8879251. Flag: Cameroon. DWT 3584 t. Type of ship: General Cargo Ship. Year of build 1970. Registered owner: OVEN LTD C/O: World Line Ltd Office 17, ul Patona 17, Kherson, 73000, Ukraine. Ship manager/Commercial manager: WORLD LINE LTD Office 17, 17 Patona St, Kherson, 73000, Ukraine.
The ship was damaged with missile fragments in the port of Chornomorsk, killing two people – a security guard and a truck driver – and injuring the ship's watchman

2. 11.09.2024. AYA. IMO: 9117868. Flag: St. Kitts and Nevis. DWT 27239 t. Type of ship: Bulk Carrier. Year of build 1997. Registered owner: AYA MARITIME CO SA C/O: VRS Maritime Services Ltd 5-7, Agiou Nikolaou Street, 185 37, Piraeus, Greece. Ship manager/Commercial manager: VRS MARITIME SERVICES LTD 5-7, Agiou Nikolaou Street, 185 37, Piraeus, Greece.
A Kh-22 anti-ship cruise missile from a Tu-22 bomber hit a bulk carrier transporting wheat from the port of Chornomorsk to Egypt. The carrier was hit and damaged at the traverse of the port of Năvodari in Romania's maritime exclusive economic zone outside the country's territorial sea. Most likely, the bulk carrier wasn't the target but was hit due to the bomber crew’s error in missile guidance or the outdated ammunition. The missile's failure to detonate helped avoid a potentially catastrophic outcome.

3. 20.09.2024. GOLDEN LION. IMO: 9363974. Flag: Antigua and Barbuda. DWT 6315 t. Type of ship: General Cargo Ship. Year of build 2006. Ship manager/Commercial manager: ASTRAMAR TRANSPORT LTD Katrinas dambis 14, LV-1045, Riga, Latvia. Registered owner: LION NAVIGATION LTD C/O: Astramar Transport Ltd (SIA 'Astramar Transport') Katrinas dambis 14, LV-1045, Riga, Latvia.
The ship was damaged when an Iskander-M ballistic missile struck the port of Odesa, injuring port workers, but not the crew.

4. 06.10.2024. PARESA. IMO: 9008134. Flag: St. Kitts and Nevis. DWT 6912 t. Type of ship: General Cargo Ship. Year of build 1992. Ship manager/Commercial manager: PARESA SHIPPING CO Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Ajeltake, Majuro MH 96960, Marshall Islands. Registered owner PARESA SHIPPING CO Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Ajeltake, Majuro MH 96960, Marshall Islands. ISM Manager: AK GROUP CO LTD 3rd Floor, 35-39, Akti Miaouli, 185 35, Piraeus, Greece.
The vessel was hit with a Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile in the area of cargo hold No. 2 in the Pivdennyi port while loading Ukrainian grain. None of the crew was injured. The owner denied Russia's claims that the vessel was transporting ammunition to Ukraine and was therefore a legitimate military target.

5. 07.10.2024, 14.10.2024. OPTIMA. IMO: 9528691. Flag: Palau. DWT 5834 t. Type of ship: General Cargo Ship. Year of build 2008. Ship manager/Commercial manager: USTA SHIPPING CO 1st Floor, 11, Agiou Spyridonos Street, Piraeus, Greece. Registered owner: USTA SHIPPING CO 1st Floor, 11, Agiou Spyridonos Street, Piraeus, Greece.
As a result of the attack, a stevedore worker was killed, and five crew members were injured.

6. 09.10.2024. SHUI SPIRIT. IMO: 9216729. Flag: Panama. DWT 21614 t. Type of ship: Container Ship. Year of build 2000. Ship manager/Commercial manager: NORTADA SHIPMANAGEMENT LDA Rua dos Murcas 15, 9000-058, Funchal Portugal. Registered owner ROSEWINT INC C/O: Nortada Shipmanagement Lda Rua dos Murcas 15, 9000-058, Funchal Portugal.
Due to shelling, the vessel docking in the port of Chornomorsk was damaged, while the crew wasn't injured. Eight people died in the city and the port, with eleven others injured – all Ukrainian citizens. Four of them were in serious condition. The missile was aimed at the port infrastructure.

7. 14.10.2024. NS MOON. IMO: 8919855. Flag: Belize. DWT 2717 t. Type of ship: General Cargo Ship. Year of build 1990. Registered owner: MOON SHIPHOLDING LTD C/O: Cargo Shipping SP Z OO ul. Mala Odrzanska 19, 70-535, Szczecin, Poland. Ship manager/Commercial manager: CARGO SHIPPING SP Z OO ul. Mala Odrzanska 19, 70-535, Szczecin, Poland.
Due to shelling, the vessel docking in the port of Odesa was damaged, while the crew wasn't injured.

Curiously, out of the 7 damaged vessels, 6 belong to EU ship-owning companies (3 to those from Greece, 1 – from Latvia, 1 – Portugal, and 1 – Poland), and 1 vessel – to a Ukrainian one. Meanwhile, the largest share of vessels operating in Ukrainian ports under the conditions of war and shelling, about 33% or over 80 ships, both in October 2024 and in previous months, belonged to shipowners from Turkey. Shipowners from Greece ranked second with 15% or 40 vessels. Even without falling into a conspiracy mindset, one cannot help but suspect selectivity in the attacks.

The analysis of the countries of registration of the ship-owning companies operating vessels in the ports of Greater Odesa shows that about 25% of the ships are EU-owned. In addition to Greece, there are shipowners from Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Malta, Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland. About 5-6% of the vessels are owned by companies from China. The share of those owned by Ukrainian companies is about 2-3%. In total, there are shipowners from almost 30 countries, which makes the Ukrainian maritime corridor a truly international operation.

In 2024, our monitoring recorded that about 70% of all ships make repeated voyages to the ports of Greater Odesa, which indicates that despite the military risks, shipowners rate the corridor's security quite highly.

We predict that Russia will continue to attack Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea and the Danube, trying to stop the operation of the maritime corridor and at the same time create conditions for increasing its own seaborne grain exports.

The fact that the number of ships arriving at Odesa ports does not actually depend on the intensity of the shelling irritates Russia and will undoubtedly encourage it to use more powerful weapons and in greater numbers. That, in turn, will create additional risks not only to international shipping in Ukrainian ports but also to Romania and Moldova.

Russia's attack on the civil cargo vessel loaded with Ukrainian grain / Photo: t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official

Since the beginning of 2024, 43 attacks with at least 100 Iskander ballistic missiles and 6 attacks with at least 9 Iskander cruise missiles have been launched against the Odesa region. During the largest of those, on 22 March 2024, 12 ballistic missiles were launched from occupied Crimea.

Since the spring of 2024, Russia has been increasingly using not one missile, but two or three at a time for an attack. At least eight such attacks were recorded: two ballistic missiles each on 15 March, 1 May, 28 May, and 14 September 2024, and three missiles each on 20 April, 17 May, 21 July, and 2 August 2024.

Since the beginning of 2024, there have been at least 47 attacks with Shahed-136/131 strike UAVs. The largest one on the Izmail district on 24 July 2024 involved 23 attack drones. As a result, several port infrastructure buildings were destroyed in Izmail.

There have been at least 12 attacks with Kh-59/Kh-69 cruise missiles on the Odesa region, the largest being on 20 April 2024 with 5 missiles, 17 May – 3 missiles, and 10 July – 4 missiles, when a bulk carrier was damaged. On 26 August 2024, an attack with 4 Kh-101 cruise missiles inflicted devastating material damage and human casualties.

In comparison, there were relatively few attacks with Kalibr naval cruise missiles, specifically, 2 attacks with 12 missiles in total.

During the spring and summer of 2024, the Odesa region suffered a number of continuous serial attacks lasting 3-7 days each. The longest were in early March – 6 days in a row and 7 days in a row with a one-day pause; in late April – 6 days in a row with a one-day pause, in mid-July and in mid-September – 5 days in a row each. July 2024 saw the most intense attacks that happened over 14 days of the month.

However, even when Russian attacks occurred daily, the number of ships calls at ports fluctuated only slightly.

Overall, due to the short flight time and insufficient air defence systems, the most destructive attacks on the port and other infrastructure of the Odesa region have been the ones with Iskander ballistic missiles from temporarily occupied Crimea.

There have been incidents with Russian missiles and strike UAVs, typically launched from Crimea, landing on the territory of Moldova and Romania:

  • On 24 July 2024 – during an attack on the Izmail district, a Shahed-131/136 attack UAV crossed the border with Romania and exploded near the village of Plauru located on the banks of the Danube, near Izmail.
  • On 25 July 2024 – three Shahed-131/136 drones were lost after crossing the border with Romania.
  • On 08 September 2024 – during an attack on the Ukrainian Danube town of Vilkovo, two Shahed-131/136 drones entered Romanian airspace.
  • On 27 September 2024 – one Shahed-131/136 entered Romanian airspace.

In addition, as mentioned above, due to a pilot error, on 11 September 2024, a Kh-22 anti-ship cruise missile from a Tu-22 bomber hit a ship on the traverse of the Romanian port of Năvodari, when only sheer luck helped avoid a tragedy.

There have already been a lot of incidents of Russian strike UAVs entering Moldova airspace – at least 3 missiles and 9 UAVs in 2024 alone. With the intensification of attacks on the Odesa region, that number has been increasing – of the 9 UAVs, 6 were recorded between 10 and 20 November 2024. No details of missile incidents in Moldova have been reported.

 

Mine Danger to Navigation as a Risk Factor in the Black Sea

A particular risk factor in the Black Sea is a mine threat. It is estimated that currently there may be about 400 sea mines in the Black Sea, but it is difficult to estimate their number more precisely because of the mines that were washed into the sea from the Dnipro River as a result of the explosion of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power station in June 2023. 

Since the beginning of the full-scale war, as of August 2024, a total of 105 drifting mines had been discovered and destroyed. Of those, experts from Ukraine defused 85 mines, Romania – 6, Bulgaria – 5, Turkey – 5, Russia – 3, and Georgia – 1.

The last reported incident occurred on 13 August 2024 when a mine washed ashore near the village of Grindul-Kituc, in the Danube Delta in southeast Romania.

In August 2022, a mine explosion on the coast killed three civilians in the Odesa region. In October and December 2023, several ships collided with mines off the coasts of Romania and Ukraine south of Zmiinyi Island.

Considering the current situation, the missile and mine threat to Romania's and Turkey's maritime natural gas production projects in the western Black Sea should not be underestimated.

Russia is expected to mine the Black Sea areas close to the grain corridor route. The covert operation may use aviation, new Russian maritime drones, and natural Black Sea currents in the expectation that the mines will be carried from the occupied coast of the Kherson region and Crimea towards Odesa.

Reducing security risks in the northwestern part of the Black Sea requires a significant reinforcement of air defence and the expansion of the activities of the Mine Countermeasures Task Group created by Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey to the entire sea area.

In general, the line between “hybrid war” and “hybrid peace” in the Black Sea is very tentative and can be crossed either deliberately or accidentally at any time.

To be continued...

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The publication has been created with the support of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation(FES). The position of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the authors.

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