Russia is developing a new strategy to increase security risks in the Black Sea in response to the defeat of the Black Sea Fleet. Part 4
The Monitoring Group of BlackSeaNews
and the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies
presents Part 4 of the Report on European security risks and forecasts as of late 2024 – early 2025, based on the monitoring results of the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies, Ukraine.
European Security Risks and Forecasts as of Early 2025. Part 1
Ways to Reduce Russia's Revenues from Seaborne Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Exports. Part 2
Russia's Ways of Raising the World Oil Prices. Part 3
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The situation in the Black Sea in the coming year will remain volatile with a tendency towards increased military risks.
This will amplify the risks to the EU countries in the Black Sea – Romania and Bulgaria – as well as to Moldova and Turkey.
In February-March 2022, Russia tasked its armed forces, including the Black Sea Fleet, with blocking Ukraine's maritime communications in the northwestern part of the Black Sea, followed by the naval landing operation in the southern parts of the coast of the Odesa and Mykolaiv regions. The goal of the operation was the occupation of the Odesa region with the resulting access to the Moldovan border in the troubled regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia, and possibly, subsequent occupation of Moldova.
To that end, on 8-9 February 2022, six additional large amphibious ships were deployed to the Black Sea from the Northern and Baltic Fleets. Thus, the landing ship grouping totalled thirteen vessels. Together, they could deliver up to 5,500 troops, 100 tanks, and 145 armoured personnel carriers to the Odesa region coast.
In February 2022, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet consisted of about 80 warships and boats and up to 200 support vessels deployed in 7 locations. In addition, Russia deployed amphibious and artillery boats of the Caspian Flotilla to the Black Sea. That naval grouping was further strengthened by several dozen ships and boats of the FSB Border Service.
In addition to the navy, over the years of the Crimean Peninsula occupation, Russia has established a powerful land force there, including modern missile and aviation branches of its armed forces, with a developed logistics infrastructure for supplying troops, including through transport links with the Russian mainland – both via sea vessels and the so-called Crimean Bridge.
The missile capabilities created in Crimea to strike at Ukraine and control the Black Sea included mobile and stationary coastal missile systems, ships and submarines carrying Kalibr and other cruise missiles, and a wide range of aircraft and aviation missile weapons.
The main naval base was located in temporarily occupied Sevastopol, where up to 85% of ships, boats and support vessels and all missile and amphibious ships and submarines were deployed.
On 25 February 2022, the next day after the start of the large-scale aggression, the Russians attempted to land a tactical marine landing unit near the village of Koblevo in the Mykolaiv region. The goals included sabotage operations in the area of the highway from Mykolaiv to Odesa, destruction of the important logistics hubs in the rear of the Ukrainian Defence Forces, and possibly facilitating a naval landing in the area of the Pivdennyi seaport. The unit was destroyed.
Subsequently, using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), missile weapons, unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), and sea mines, the Ukrainian Defence Forces managed to inflict serious losses on Russia's Black Sea Fleet.
Between 24 February 2022 and 8 June 2024, the Ukrainian Defence Forces carried out at least 42 effective attacks on Russian warships in the Azov-Black Sea region, in ports and on the high seas (see Table 1).
A total of 22 ships and boats were destroyed, excluding those beyond repair, while 20 ones were damaged, including those beyond repair.
Of those, 8 boats were destroyed with Bayraktar UAVs, 14 ships and boats – destroyed or damaged with various types of missiles, 15 – with USVs, 4 – likely damaged by sea mines and 1 – as a result of sabotage (for the full list, see Appendix 3).
The most painful losses for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet were the destruction of its flagship, the Moskva missile cruiser, and the destruction and serious damage of 7 out of 13 large amphibious assault ships, a missile submarine and a missile corvette, both carrying Kalibr cruise missiles.
Coupled with the successful Ukrainian missile attack on the Black Sea Fleet’s headquarters in Sevastopol on 23 September 2023, those resulted in the redeployment of the fleet's main forces from Sevastopol and other Crimean ports to Russia's Novorossiysk.
Table 1. Russian Black Sea Fleet Losses as of June 2024
№ |
Ship/submarine/vessel |
Strike Date |
Results |
Notes |
|
Patrol boat pr. 03160 (Raptor class) |
21.03.2022 |
destroyed |
ATGM strike (Mariupol) |
|
Landing ship pr. 1171 Saratov (Tapir class) |
24.03.2022 |
destroyed |
Strike with a missile complex Tochka-U |
|
Frigate pr. 11356R Admiral Essen (Admiral Grigorovich class) |
05.04.2022 |
damaged |
Strike with a 1 P-360 Neptun missile. |
|
Missile cruiser pr. 1164 Moskva (Slava class) |
14.04.2022 |
destroyed |
Strike with 2 P-360 Neptun missiles |
|
Patrol boat pr. 03160 (Raptor class) |
02.05.2022 |
destroyed |
Strike with a Bayraktar TB2 UAV (Zmiinyi Island) |
|
Patrol boat pr. 03160 (Raptor class) |
07.05.2022 |
destroyed |
Strike with a Bayraktar TB2 UAV (Zmiinyi Island) |
|
Landing craft pr. 11770 (Serna class) |
07.05.2022 |
destroyed |
Strike with a Bayraktar TB2 UAV (Zmiinyi Island) |
|
Patrol boat pr. 03160 (Raptor class) |
07.05.2022 |
destroyed |
Strike with a Bayraktar TB2 UAV (Zmiinyi Island) |
|
Landing craft pr. 02510 (ВK-16 class) |
May 2022 |
destroyed (requires clarification) |
Strike with a Bayraktar TB2 UAV (Zmiinyi Island) |
|
Rescue tug pr. 22870 Spasatel Vasiliy Bekh (Project 22870 class) |
17.06.2022 |
destroyed |
Strike with 2 Harpoon anti-ship missiles |
|
Landing craft pr. 1776 (Ondatra class) |
02.07.2022 |
damaged |
Sustained damage due to a mine barrier near the city of Mariupol |
|
Patrol boat pr. 03160 (Raptor class) |
24.07.2022 |
destroyed (damaged) |
Strike with a Bayraktar TB2 UAV |
|
Patrol boat pr. 03v160 (Raptor class) |
24.07.2022 |
destroyed (damaged) |
Strike with a Bayraktar TB2 UAV |
|
Patrol ships pr. 22160 Vasiliy Bykov |
04.08.2022 |
destroyed (requires clarification) |
Strike with USVs (presumably) near the anchorage of Sevastopol |
|
Naval minesweeper pr. 266M Ivan Holubets (Natya class) |
29.10.2022 |
damaged |
Strike with USVs near the anchorage of Sevastopol |
|
Presumably, Frigate pr. 11356R Admiral Essen (Admiral Grigorovich class) |
29.10.2022 |
damaged |
Strike with USVs near the anchorage of Sevastopol |
|
Recoinaissance ship pr. 864 Priazovye (Vishnya class) |
11.06.2023 |
damaged |
Strike with USVs in the area southeast of Sevastopol |
|
Landing ship pr. 775 Olenegorsky Gornyak (Ropucha class) |
04.08.2023 |
damaged |
Strike with USVs |
|
Oil tanker-chemical carrier pr. 52 Sig (used in the interests of the MoD RF). |
05.08.2023 |
damaged |
Strike with USVs near the city of Kerch |
|
Small patrol boat pr. 640 KС-701 |
03.09.2023 |
destroyed |
Strike with a Bayraktar TB2 UAV (northwest part of the Black Sea) |
|
Conventional attack submarine pr. 636.3 Rostov-on-Don B-237 (improved Kilo-class) |
13.09.2023 |
sustained significant damage |
Presumably, a strike with a Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG cruise missile |
|
Landing ship pr. 775 Minsk (Ropucha class) |
13.09.2023 |
sustained significant damage |
Presumably, a strike with a Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG cruise missile |
|
Corvette pr. 1239 Samum (Bora class) |
14.09.2023 |
damaged |
Strike with USVs near the anchorage of Sevastopol |
|
Patrol ships pr. 22160 Pavlo Derzhavin |
12.10.2023 |
damaged |
Sustained damage due to a mine barrier (presumably) near the anchorage of Sevastopol |
|
Sea tug pr. 22870 Professor Nikolay Muru |
12.10.2023 |
damaged |
Sustained damage due to a mine barrier (presumably) near the anchorage of Sevastopol while towing the damaged patrol ship pr. 22160 Pavlo Derzhavin |
|
Large hydrographic survey boat pr. 23040G Volodymyr Kozitsky |
26.10.2023 |
damaged |
Sustained damage on a minefield, likely, near the Sevastopol roadstead while surveying the area for sea mines |
|
Corvette pr. 22800 Askold (Karakurt class) |
04.11.2023 |
sustained significant damage |
Strike with 2 Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missile systems (probable) |
|
Landing craft pr. 11770 (Serna class) |
10.11.2023 |
destroyed (damaged) |
Attack with USVs near Chornomorske |
|
Landing craft pr. 11770 (Serna class) (possibly pr. 1776, Ondatra class) |
10.11.2023 |
destroyed (damaged) |
Attack with USVs near Chornomorske |
|
Landing ship pr. 775 Novocherkassk (Ropucha class) |
26.12.2023 |
destroyed |
24.03.2022 – damaged with a Tochka-U missile system 26.12.2023 – finally destroyed by a strike with, likely, a Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missile system (probably) |
|
Corvette pr. 12411 Ivanovets (Tarantul сlass) |
01.02.2024 |
destroyed |
Attack with USVs on Donuzlav Island |
|
Landing ship pr. 775 Caesar Kunikov (Ropucha class) |
24.02.2024 |
destroyed |
Attack with USVs on Donuzlav Island near Alupka |
|
Patrol ship pr. 22160 Sergei Kotov |
05.03.2024 |
destroyed |
Attack with USVs near Kerch |
|
Landing ship pr. 775 Yamal (Ropucha class) |
24.03.2024 |
damaged (requires clarification) |
A strike with a Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missile system (likely, Sevastopol) |
|
Landing ship pr. 775 Azov (Ropucha class) |
24.03.2024 |
damaged (requires clarification) |
A strike with a Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missile system (likely, Sevastopol) |
|
Intelligence ship pr. 18280 Ivan Khurs (Yury Ivanov class) |
24.03.2024 |
damaged (requires clarification) |
A strike with a Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missile system (likely, Sevastopol) |
37. |
Small missile ship pr. 21631 Buyan-M |
07.04.2024 |
damaged |
DIU Special Operation at the Baltiysk Naval Base (Kaliningrad Region) |
38. |
Rescue vessel Kommun |
21.04.2024 |
damaged |
Missile attack on the Sevastopol Naval Base |
39. |
Patrol boat pr. 12150 Mongoose |
06.05.2024 |
destroyed |
USV attack, Vuzka Bay (Chornomorsk district, TOT Crimea) |
40. |
Small missile ship pr. 22800 Cyclone |
19.05.2024 |
destroyed |
Data on the means of destruction remain to be clarified. Likely point of impact — the Sevastopol naval base |
41-42. |
Amphibious assault boat pr. 701C codename Tuna |
30.05.2024 |
destroyed two boats |
USV attack, likely in Vuzka Bay (Chornomorsk district, TOT of Crimea). |
In addition, the availability and successful use of missile weapons and USVs by the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) have made the Russian Black Sea Fleet extremely cautious.
Even though no new successful attacks on Russian warships have been recorded since June 2024, the Russian fleet had remained mostly in Novorossiysk, taking advantage of the fact that Ukraine had no permission to use Western missiles against targets in Russia. As soon as Ukraine obtained this permission in late November 2024, despite the risk of the USV attacks, the Black Sea Fleet Command began regularly putting its main ships out of the Novorossiysk naval base to the sea, close to the coast, in order to reduce the missile threat.
The monitoring results show that in contrast to Russia's claims about the state of its economy and the development of its military industry, its Black Sea Fleet now faces a shortage of Kalibr cruise missiles. Their use against Ukraine, so demonstrative in 2022-2023, unexpectedly stopped in October 2023, resuming in early 2024 in far smaller numbers.
In 2022, the use of Kalibr missiles totalled 160-180 units per year, or an average of 16-18 missiles per month. In the first 9 months of 2023, this number reached 245 missiles, or 27 units monthly. However, from October to December 2023, these missiles were not used at all. Over the 10 months of 2024, 68 Kalibr missiles were launched from ships in the Black and Azov Seas and 14 more – from the Caspian Flotilla, averaging 8 monthly. According to available data, due to insufficient production, the Russians were forced to transfer missile stocks to the Black Sea Fleet from their other fleets.
Therefore, when assessing the state of the Russian industry under sanctions, this fact should be taken into account, along with the supply of missiles and shells from North Korea and the technical condition of Russia’s civilian aircraft.
That, however, doesn't mean that the Russians have given up either the goal of blocking Ukraine's maritime communications in the northwestern Black Sea or that of capturing the Odesa region coast.
Despite the losses, the Russian Federation maintains a fairly powerful grouping in the Black and Azov Seas. It would be naive to assume that Russia's Black Sea Fleet remains idle. According to sources, at present it's urgently trying to develop new tactics for countering Ukrainian USV and missile threats.
Among other things, Russia is now working on creating its own USV fleet. Without a doubt, the emergence of Russian unmanned sea drones as a new threat to the Black Sea navigation is a matter of time.
Since Russia's Black Sea Fleet suffered heavy losses of landing ships and boats, the likelihood of a future classic naval assault on the coast of the Odesa region has significantly decreased. Nevertheless, that likelihood certainly depends on the level of the AFU’s supply with anti-ship missiles, both Ukrainian and foreign-made ones.
To be continued...
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The publication has been created with the support of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation(FES). The position of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the authors.
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