The Duration of Artificial Delays of Vessels in the Kerch Strait. The Monitoring for December 2021

Andrii KLYMENKO
Tetyana GUCHAKOVA
Olha KORBUT

The Monitoring Group of BlackSeaNews and the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies

The Monitoring Group of the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies and BlackSeaNews wishes to bring to your attention the latest in a series of our monthly reports on Russia's economic war against Ukraine in the Sea of Azov.

1. In December 2021, the average duration of artificial delays of vessels going from the Black Sea to the Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov − Mariupol and Berdiansk − by the Russian Federation (RF) was 20.3 hours (See Figure 1).

In December 2021, a total of 60 vessels passed through the Kerch Strait from the Black Sea in the direction of the Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov – Mariupol and Berdiansk (See Table 1). When calculating the duration of artificial delays of vessels from the time of their arrival to the moment of obtaining a permit to pass through the Kerch Strait, 60 ships have been taken into account. 

Of the 60 vessels listed, 31 were related to EU countries on the basis of the flag state and/or the shipowner's country of registration. The average wait time for a permit to pass through the Kerch Strait was 20.3 hours per vessel, and for vessels related to EU countries – 19.9 hours per vessel.

Table 1. Artificial Delays of Vessels en Route to (UA) Mariupol and (UA) Berdiansk at the Entrance to the Sea of Azov (December 2021)

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2. In December 2021, vessels carrying exports from Mariupol and Berdiansk were delayed at the exit from the Sea of Azov by the Russian Federation for an average of 45.5 hours (See Figure 2).

From December 2018 to December 2020, due to the threat of the "Azov package" of international sanctions against Russian ports on the Sea of Azov, there was a slight decrease in the average duration of artificial delays of ships at the exit from the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea: in 2018 − 79.5 hours; in 2019 − up to 37.4 hours; in 2020 − 29.6 hours per vessel. In 2021, this figure has increased significantly to 39.8 hours per vessel and already exceeded those for 2019 and 2020.

In December 2021, a total of 55 vessels passed through the Kerch Strait from the Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov – Mariupol and Berdiansk – in the direction of the Black Sea (See Table 2). When calculating the duration of artificial delays of vessels from the time of their arrival to the moment of obtaining a permit to pass through the Kerch Strait, 51 vessels have been taken into account. The remaining 4 vessels have been excluded from the calculations due to stormy weather, which led to their long delays.

Table 2. Artificial Delays of Vessels en Route From (UA) Mariupol and (UA) Berdiansk at the Exit from the Sea of Azov (December 2021)

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Thus, of the 55 vessels listed, 28 were related to EU countries on the basis of the flag state, and/or the shipowner's country of registration, and/or the port of destination. The average wait time for a permit to pass through the Kerch Strait was 45.5 hours per vessel, and for vessels related to EU countries – 35.7 hours per vessel.

For reference. During the entire monitoring period (since June 2018), the wait time for permission to pass through the Kerch Strait for vessels carrying export cargoes from the Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea and beyond has almost always been much longer than for vessels sailing in ballast (without cargoes) from the Black Sea to Mariupol and Berdiansk.

This is explained by the following factors. Vessels going to the Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov are waiting for the permit at the anchorage in Area 1 (see Figure 3), i.e. directly in the Kerch Strait. Next to it, there is a large anchorage of the RF's Port Kavkaz (Area 4), where transshipment of Russian cargoes delivered by Russia's ships from Russian ports on the Volga and Don rivers is carried out. Thus, the accumulation of a large number of vessels at the anchorage in Area 1 creates inconvenience for the Russian transshipment in Area 4.

Vessels going from the Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov are waiting for permission to pass through the Kerch Strait at the anchorage in Area 3, i.e. in the Sea of Azov, near the entrance to the Kerch Strait. The accumulation of a large number of ships there does not interfere with the work of the Russian transshipment. This makes it possible to hold vessels at the anchorage in Area 3 for much longer without any obstacles to Russian traffic through the Kerch Strait.

Moreover, lengthy artificial delays of ships with Ukrainian export cargoes have a negative impact on the delivery time of Ukrainian cargoes to customers in the EU, Turkey, the Middle East, and North Africa.

3. From 22 October 2018 to November 2021, there were no delays of ships while on the move, going from/to Berdiansk and Mariupol, in the Sea of Azov, because the Ukrainian Navy boats were escorting the vessels.

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Historical Background

Prolonged inspections in the Kerch Strait of merchant ships going to/from the Ukrainian ports on the Sea of ​​Azov (Mariupol, Berdiansk) were initiated by the Coast Guard of the FSB Border Service in May-June 2018 – after the commissioning of the Kerch Bridge.

The pretext for such inspections is the possible presence aboard ships leaving the Ukrainian ports of sabotage groups and explosives to destroy the Kerch Bridge (V. Putin’s pet project). This, incidentally, explains the fact that ships bound for Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov are delayed in the Kerch Strait for a shorter time than those leaving the Ukrainian ports. For example, in March 2021, the average duration of artificial delays by Russia of ships bound for Mariupol or Berdiansk was 14.3 hours and on the way back – 41.8 hours.

Prior to the beginning of the de facto blockade of Ukrainian ports in May 2018, the average waiting time for permission to pass through the Kerch Strait was 5-7 hours. In the second half of 2018, this figure reached 80-115 hours. The situation was later eased due to political and diplomatic pressure on Russia from Western countries.

Back then, this obstruction of traffic was already considered in the context of Russia's demands concerning other issues, such as exploring the possibility of resuming the supply of Dnieper water to occupied Crimea.

The reduction in the time of artificial delays of vessels in the Kerch Strait since December 2018 was due to the imminent threat of the introduction of the "Azov package" of international sanctions against the Russian ports on the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. In addition, this reduction was due to linking the Azov problem to the EU's decision on permits to continue the construction of the Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline. We even called this decrease the "Merkel-Macron coefficient."

In 2019, the average duration of artificial delays per vessel was 37.4 hours; in 2020, this figure dropped to 29.6 hours. This decrease resulted from Russian border guards of the FSB Coast Guard’s fear of contracting COVID-19, as up to half of the vessels subject to inspections were going from ports of Italy and other European countries, where in the spring of 2020, a significant outbreak of the pandemic occurred.

In November 2020-April 2021, there was a considerable increase in the duration of artificial delays, which reached an average of 53 hours.

The maximum average duration of artificial delays of ships leaving the Sea of Azov in 2021 was observed in April – 70 hours. The longest duration of delays of individual vessels at the exit from the Sea of Azov (compared to the waiting time at the entrance to the Sea of Azov) was recorded in the first half of April 2021, when it reached 220 hours, i.e. almost 10 days.

This coincided with the transfer of a significant number of Russian troops and equipment – including a group of 15 warships of the Caspian flotilla across the Sea of Azov – to occupied Crimea during the spring military escalation.

Later, in May-June 2021, these indicators returned to the average values of the previous year: more than 20 hours. This was due to the seasonal increase in Russian marine grain exports through transshipment in the Kerch Strait. During this period, a great number of merchant ships, carrying grain from Russian regions on the river Volga through the Sea of Azov and transshipping it in the Kerch Strait to large foreign vessels, accumulate in the Kerch Strait.

Therefore, artificial delays of a large number of Mariupol and Berdiansk-bound vessels in the Kerch Strait hinder the transshipment of Russian grain.

On average, about 60-70 vessels enter/leave the Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov every month. About 50% of them are related to the EU in one way or another (the flag, shipowner, port of destination, or a combination of such features).

They account for 5-7% of Ukraine's exports (mainly metal and grain). The number of vessels passing through the Kerch Strait to/from the Russian ports on the Sea of Azov, the Don, and the Volga is measured in hundreds per month. This river-sea route is used by the Russian Federation for very significant grain exports. Thus, when Russia forces the vessels carrying Ukrainian grain cargoes to wait, it also creates obstacles for the competitor in the world grain market. In addition, it is one of the main routes of maritime exports of Russian oil products through transshipment in the Kerch Strait.

From May to October 2018, we also recorded delays of commercial vessels going to/from Mariupol and Berdiansk on the move by ships and boats of the Coast Guard of the FSB Border Service for "security checks." There were a total of 110 such delays at sea, including 56 delays of vessels related to EU countries. A significant part of such delays took place only 5-7 miles from the port of Mariupol. These delays at sea ended in October 2018.

The reason these delays on the move stopped were the following two factors. The first was the fact that 2 small armoured gun boats of the Ukrainian Navy (Project 58155, Gyurza-M class) appeared in the Sea of Azov and began patrolling the Kerch Strait – Berdiansk – Mariupol route. At the end of October 2018, there were 2 incidents when Ukrainian boats prevented the boats of the Coast Guard of the FSB of the Russian Federation from stopping commercial vessels (including the warning of the use of weapons).

The second factor was political and diplomatic pressure on Russia from Western countries and extensive coverage of these events in the Western media.

For Reference: the Areas Where Freedom of Navigation Was Violated
Are Marked on the Map

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This article has been prepared with the support of the European Union in Ukraine. The content of the article is the sole responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the position of the EU.