Russia’s Civil Aviation in 2025: Flying Close to the Edge

The Monitoring Group of BlackSeaNews
and the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies

By mid-2025, Russian civil aviation has found itself facing unprecedented challenges. The cumulative impact of Western sanctions, the deterioration of technical infrastructure, and an inevitable rise in the number of critical system failures across every segment of the industry have brought it to a breaking point.

The sector is experiencing its most acute crisis in decades. BSN monitoring for the first seven months of 2025 has already clearly confirmed a further increase in the number of aviation incidents compared to 2023 and 2024, with wing mechanism malfunctions, air conditioning system failures, brake and landing gear issues, as well as fuel leaks becoming daily occurrences.

Nowhere, however, is the rise in equipment failures more evident than in engines and TACS. From January through July 2025, dozens of serious powerplant breakdowns have been recorded, along with nearly 100 unscheduled landings triggered by technical system faults—including at least 17 engine-related incidents involving both Western-built aircraft (Boeing, Airbus) and Russian-made Sukhoi Superjet and Antonov An-24 models.

Aircraft issues by type

Western aircraft — primarily the Airbus A320/A321 and Boeing 737 families, which carry 90% of Russia’s passenger traffic — are now in an extremely vulnerable position, as airlines attempt to keep them operational without factory spare parts or certified outside support. Russian aviation officials openly acknowledge that within the next five years, around 30%, or 200, of these aircraft will have to be removed from service entirely.

The Sukhoi Superjet 100 (SSJ-100) is faring no better. Although marketed as “domestic,” the SSJ-100 relies heavily on Western components, most notably the Franco-Russian PowerJet SaM146 engines and key avionics modules. In 2025, there has already been a steady rise in breakdowns related to contaminated or counterfeit fuel, installation of uncertified parts, and “emergency” repairs—all of which further increase risk.

Experts state that without access to new parts, most Superjet aircraft will only last another year at most, after which they will have to be grounded.

The situation with the An-24/26—still the primary means of transport across the vast expanses of Siberia and the Russian Far East—is rapidly approaching collapse. Just this year, inspections have uncovered persistent regulatory violations and dangerous makeshift solutions. The tragic crash of an Angara Airlines An-24 in July, which killed all 48 people on board, prompted emergency intervention by regulators and the temporary grounding of several regional fleets. The fundamental problem with the An-24/26 fleet, however, is that most of these aircraft are already 40 to 50 years old, making modernization essentially impossible.

Although 2025 is the last year of legal operation for most Russian aircraft, Rosaviatsiya has just extended the service life of the Yak-40 and An-26 by another 10 years, and of the An-148-100 from 10 to 30 years.

Ironically, China has offered to replace Russia’s Antonov aircraft with the Chinese Xi'an MA60 and MA600—Chinese versions of the same Antonov models for which China once obtained a license from the USSR. Unlike Russia’s An-24/26, these aircraft are still being produced and upgraded. However, when and in what quantities such replacements will happen remains unknown. At present, only Chinese turboprop aircraft have any prospects in the near future, but they remain only at the conceptual development stage.

Meanwhile, planned production of new Russian airliners—MC-21, Tu-214, and Il-114-300—continues to lag behind schedule; as of now, actual deliveries are years behind Kremlin projections. Replacing the MC-21’s foreign components is proving especially difficult. From the outset, this aircraft was designed with American engines and avionics, and Russia lacks the technological base to replace them, admitting that it is at least 40 years behind in both engine technology and composite materials. In January, the government approved an MC-21 variant that is 8.5 meters shorter, due to the impossibility of operating the standard-size aircraft on long-haul routes after it was fitted with heavier domestic components.

Once again, Russia may turn for help to China, which is developing its own aircraft engines. However, Chinese aircraft like COMAC C919 and ARJ21 are themselves powered by Western-supplied engines and electronics, making them just as vulnerable to sanctions. Additionally, China itself faces a huge internal backlog of demand for both parts and maintenance. If it can supply Russia with reliable engines, the MC-21 may have a future, according to experts, but not until 2029 at the earliest. 

Parts, Leasing, and the Grey Market

With legal parts increasingly unavailable, Russia’s airlines continue to rely heavily on “parallel import” schemes and shadowy transshipment rings to secure critical spares. Most sought-after items in 2025 include: carbon brake pads, wheels/landing gear kits, and avionics modules — especially for Boeing and Airbus types. 

Russian use of proxies, front companies, and “slicing” of individual shipments through countries like Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and the UAE, with the last two being the major and most crucial operation hubs, remains ongoing.

Ownership complexities compound the crisis: hundreds of previously Western-leased jets are now de facto expropriated, their international airworthiness certificates voided.

In 2024, Russia has approached Qatar and Kuwait with a cabotage proposal for Russian domestic flights. But as of August 2025, there has been still no practical reaction to the proposal. Also, Russian carriers sometimes “wet lease” planes, with crew, from third countries — primarily in Central Asia — for select routes, but most states remain reluctant to step in. The most recent case in point is Ethiopia where the leaked in July information on the wet-lease negotiations with Russia was followed not only by Ethiopia’s immediate withdrawal from the deal, but also, by its authorities’ categorical denial that any such negotiations ever took place.

The situation is a direct result of the EU February 2025 sanctions banning flights to Europe of any airlines that lease aircraft, crew and staff to Russia or engage in cabotage transportation within the RF.

Safety and Oversight

Regulatory oversight is increasingly conducted as a mere formality: inspections — including crucial C and D checks — are backdated, falsified, carried out with uncertified means, or not performed at all. Domestic regulatory “certification” has replaced international standards but is not recognized abroad, further isolating Russian airlines.

Following its fatal July 2025 crash, Angara Airlines was found to have systematically falsified maintenance logs, neglected mandatory airworthiness directives, and employed unqualified technicians — issues state agencies Rosaviatsiya and Rostransnadzor have proven unable or unwilling to address. Russia now faces formal “red-flag” warnings from international civil aviation authorities regarding its safety oversight. 

Training standards are also deteriorating. With the loss of access to ICAO and EASA-certified instruction and Type Rating programs, Russian training is increasingly “in-house” and self-referential. This divergence from international best practices erodes long-term pilot and technician proficiency.

Insurance and Industry Structure

The June 2025 landmark UK High Court ruling delivered a major blow to Russian operators by favoring Western lessors in multi-billion-dollar insurance claims for jets seized after 2022. Meanwhile, domestic insurers now face unprecedented exposure: multi-claim disasters and routine inflight incidents threaten to overwhelm available reinsurance capacity, forcing premium hikes or outright withdrawal of aviation coverage.

The industry’s structure also continues to shift as small, independent carriers fold or are absorbed by larger, state-aligned entities better able to bear the financial, regulatory, and technical strain.

Profitability

Despite media claims of sector “profitability,” the 2025 reality is grim. Analysts detail how any profits are largely notional, produced by government subsidies and strong demand for air service across Russia’s vast territory. 

Beneath the surface, though, costs are rising fast: engine overhauls and part replacements on the gray market carry extreme premiums, routine repairs demand costly improvisation, and legal/insurance liabilities mount. Only state-backed giants show nominal returns, while most carriers face deep deficits.

Forecast
Without a fundamental change in sanctions policy or the sudden large-scale production of truly domestic aircraft and engines, Russian civil aviation can expect:

• a significant increase in the accident rate across the fleet;
• the withdrawal of more and more aircraft from service and a corresponding reduction in the number of flights, which will further isolate many regions of Russia from both the center and each other;
• a continued decline in the expertise of pilots and other technical specialists relative to global standards;
• a critical decrease in market profitability and a growing dependence on state subsidies.

In sum: Russian civil aviation in 2025 is approaching its critical point, as access to the Western technology that once underpinned its reliability continues to erode. Having said that, the continuous support of China, the Central Asian states and especially, Turkey and the UAE who have become linchpins and major hubs of Russia’s smuggling aircraft parts operations and coverup thereof, still allows its civil aviation to keep afloat. The international community must implement effective pressure mechanisms on these countries in order to ultimately ground Russian civil aviation for good.

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This publication has been produced with the support of the European Endowment for Democracy (EED). Its contents do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of EED. Responsibility for the information and views expressed in this publication lies entirely with the authors.