Russia’s Seaborne Crude Oil Exports Decline for Third Consecutive Month as Ukrainian Strikes Disrupt Oil Infrastructure and Black Sea Shipping

Russia’s seaborne crude oil exports have fallen sharply for three consecutive months across all maritime regions. In September 2026, exports totaled 22.1 million tonnes, down 5.4 million tonnes (19.6%) from the record 27.5 million tonnes in June.

The decline suggests that the additional crude oil volumes that entered global markets after Ukrainian strikes disrupted Russian refining capacity are no longer a significant factor.

Russia’s Seaborne Crude Oil Exports: September 2026

The following analysis covers crude oil shipments from Russian ports across all maritime regions, excluding Kazakh oil. 

1. Overall Export Trends

Following a record high in June 2026, Russian seaborne crude oil exports declined steadily:

• June: 27.5 million tonnes
• July: 26.0 million tonnes
• August: 23.7 million tonnes
• September: 22.1 million tonnes

The sustained decline points to the impact of the Ukrainian Defense Forces’ strategic campaign targeting Russian oil refineries and shipping in the Black Sea, rather than international sanctions.

2. September Exports by Maritime Region

Baltic Sea: 10.4 million tonnes, down 1.4 million tonnes (-12.3%) from August.

Black Sea: 2.6 million tonnes, up 0.3 million tonnes from August. While this represents a modest monthly recovery, the percentage increase would obscure the broader picture: September volumes remained approximately 2.3 times below the average of 6 million tonnes per month recorded during the first seven months of 2026.

Russian Far East: 6.8 million tonnes, down 0.8 million tonnes (-10.38%) from August.
Arctic: 2.2 million tonnes, up slightly by 0.15 million tonnes.

3. Black Sea: Detailed Assessment

3.1. Crude Oil Tanker Traffic

A total of 24 crude oil tankers departed Russian Black Sea ports in September 2026. This excludes one additional tanker that was unable to load after sustaining damage in a Ukrainian attack.

Of those 24 departures, 19 occurred during the first half of September. That initial pace suggested Russia might have restored operations at its Black Sea oil terminals following Ukrainian strikes.

The full-month data, however, did not support that assessment. September departures exceeded August’s total of 22 tankers by just two vessels, indicating that any recovery remained limited.

3.2. Export Volumes Remain Well Below Historical Levels

Total tanker deadweight tonnage reached 2.6 million tonnes in September, compared with 2.3 million tonnes in August. Of the September total, 2.0 million tonnes had already been recorded during the first 15 days.

Despite the 0.3-million-tonne month-over-month increase, Russian Black Sea ports remained well below their average monthly volume of 4.3 million tonnes in 2025 and January–February 2026.

3.3. Tanker Destination Reporting Raises Questions

Destination declarations by the 24 tankers entering the Black Sea reveal a notable pattern:

• Only 2 identified Novorossiysk as their next port of call while transiting the Sea of Marmara.
• 1 declared Taman as its destination. Its transit time was consistent with a possible loading operation there.
• 8 listed Batumi, Georgia, before their AIS/GPS signals went offline. Available evidence suggests they were unlikely to have called at Batumi.
• 13 reported no destination.

The increasingly frequent use of Batumi as an apparent false destination raises questions about the role of Georgian ports in Russian oil shipping.
Given Georgia’s efforts to avoid EU sanctions related to Russian oil trade, the pattern merits diplomatic scrutiny, including formal requests for clarification from Georgian authorities.

3.4. Sanctioned Tankers Account for a Growing Share of Black Sea Traffic

September data show a sharp increase in the presence of sanctioned tankers:

• Sanctioned vessels represented 62.5% of total tanker deadweight tonnage, compared with 19–33% in previous months.
• Of the 24 tankers recorded, 19 (79.2%) were subject to sanctions imposed by Ukraine, the European Union, the United Kingdom, or the United States.

One possible explanation is that shipowners are increasingly reluctant to expose non-sanctioned vessels to the risk of Ukrainian attacks. Sanctioned tankers have become particularly prominent targets, potentially encouraging operators to reserve their non-sanctioned fleets for less hazardous routes.

4. The SIREN Case: A Ukrainian-Sanctioned Tanker Repaired in an EU Port

The tanker SIREN (IMO 9405423), reportedly attacked on September 4, 2026, according to maritime industry reports, is excluded from the September calculations above.

The vessel is owned by:
EUROTANKERS INC
5th Floor, 99 Akti Miaouli
185 38 Piraeus, Greece
SIREN has been subject to Ukrainian sanctions since February 12, 2026.

Most tankers damaged in the Black Sea have undergone repairs at Turkish shipyards in the Sea of Marmara. SIREN, however, was repaired in Bulgaria:

• September 9: Arrived in ballast at the anchorage off Varna, Bulgaria.
• September 12: Entered a Varna shipyard for repairs.
• September 21: Departed the shipyard following completion of repairs.

The case is notable because a port in an EU member state provided repair services to a vessel sanctioned by Ukraine.

Although Ukrainian sanctions do not automatically impose corresponding legal restrictions within the EU, the incident raises questions about sanctions coordination and may merit diplomatic follow-up.

Data Source

All figures are drawn from the Database of Tankers Transporting Russian Oil and Petroleum Products, a proprietary, specialized resource developed and maintained by the Monitoring Group of the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies.